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This study investigated the relation between expert and target scoring of a video-based so-
cial understanding test (VSU) under two different types of instructions (internal and ob-
server). The effects of the scoring methods and instructions on the VSU’s construct validity
were also examined. A total of 529 pilot applicants completed the VSU (some with internal
and some with observer instructions), cognitive ability and knowledge tests, and a personal-
ity questionnaire. A subsample (n = 132) completed the VSU again with the other instruc-
tions and participated in an assessment center (AC). The two scores were moderately
correlated; correlations decreased when the instructions were considered. Neither expert
nor target scores showed convergent validity with AC variables; none of the scoring-
instruction combinations showed significant associations with the remaining measures.
1. Introduction
Social understanding (also known as social inference,social interpretation, or social judgment) is the ability
to understand social stimuli against the background of
the corresponding social situation (O’Sullivan, Guilford,
& DeMille, 1965; Wedeck, 1947). This involves the re-
cognition of the mental states that are behind people’s
words (Moss, Hunt, Omwake, & Woodward, 1955), the
comprehension of observed behaviors in the social con-
text in which they occur (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1966),
and the decoding of social cues (Barnes & Sternberg,
1989). We regard social understanding as a cognitive
ability that makes up the central part of social intelli-
gence (SI) and define it as the ability to understand so-
cial information in a given situation and to interpret it
correctly (Weis, Seidel, & Süß, 2006). Social understand-
ing is seen as a potential-based construct (Guilford,
1967; Moss et al., 1955; Wedeck, 1947) that is consid-
ered to be a precondition for behaving in a socially com-
petent manner. As with other cognitive constructs
(e.g., academic intelligence), social understanding is best
measured with performance tests. Studies indicate that
social understanding can be measured reliably and is suf-
ficiently distinguishable from academic intelligence and
personality (Conzelmann, Weis, & Süß, 2013; Seidel,
2008; Weis, 2008). Comparable findings have also
been obtained for emotional understanding, which rep-
resents emotional intelligence – EI (e.g., Austin, 2010;
Freudenthaler & Neubauer, 2005; MacCann, 2010;
Sharma, Gangopadhyay, Austin, & Mandal, 2013).
In line with other researchers (i.e., Davies, Stankov, &
Roberts, 1998; Kang, Day, & Meara, 2005; Mayer,
Salovey, & Caruso, 2000; Weis & Süß, 2005), we see SI
as overlapping with the construct of EI when viewed as
an ability (see Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Studies on the
relation between SI and EI performance tests (i.e.,
Davies et al., 1998; Weis & Süß, 2007) are both scarce
and hard to compare because of different theoretical
underpinnings. Since theoretical conceptions of EI and SI
usually ignored each other, contradictions resulted. For
example, Salovey and Mayer (1990) originally devised
‘emotional intelligence as a subset of SI’ (p. 189). In later
publications (Mayer & Salovey, 1993, 1997), EI was
viewed as an extension of SI, and thereafter, SI was ig-
nored. Barchard (2003) sees SI as part of EI without
elaboration. According to Weis (2008), in comparing
tasks from the most prominent measure of EI (i.e., the
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Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test –
Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) with an SI cognitive
ability model (Weis & Süß, 2005), SI focuses on others
(i.e., emotions in social interactions), whereas EI in-
cludes the self and others. However, we view SI as
involving an understanding of cognitions and behavior
in addition to emotions in social situations (see
Conzelmann et al., 2013). Nonetheless, significant
data-based analyses of the relation between the two
constructs are needed to consider the cognitive re-
quirements of both constructs as well as the content
domains in which they are represented (for more de-
tails, see Weis et al., 2006).
A major issue in dealing with tests of SI and EI is the
problem of defining the correct answer (Mayer, Caruso,
& Salovey, 2000). An appropriate scoring key is much
more complex for social and emotional matters than for
academic intelligence and knowledge. Academic intelli-
gence tests apply logical rules (typically mathematical
problems), semantic rules (the dictionary), scientific
rules (truthfulness as determined by scientific studies),
or knowledge (Guttmann & Levy, 1991) to unequi-
vocally determine the correct answers to reasoning,
spatial, memory, numerical, and verbal tasks (Matthews,
Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002; Roberts, Zeidner, &
Matthews, 2001). A common approach to measuring so-
cial abilities with a performance-based concept is the ap-
plication of situational judgment tests (SJT), which are
used as a realistic way to simulate everyday problem
situations. They do not allow the formulation of unam-
biguously correct solutions that correspond to reality
since both real-world social situations and individuals
are ambiguous, dynamic, and complex. Thus, for these
kinds of social and emotional ability tasks, there is no
absolute right or wrong response to a question or situ-
ation. In the past, three main approaches for determin-
ing the correct answer to a social or emotional question
have been implemented: group consensus scoring, ex-
pert scoring, and target scoring. However, each ap-
proach has both advantages and shortcomings.
1.1. Group consensus scoring
Group consensus scoring reflects the majority opinion
of laypersons (i.e., test takers). Proportion-based con-
sensus scoring is the most prominent consensus scoring
approach and is also typically used in EI testing (Mayer
et al., 2002). A score is allocated to a response accord-
ing to the proportion of people endorsing that response
(e.g., in a sample, if 50% choose response A as correct,
30% response B, and 20% response C, response A re-
ceives a score of .50, response B a score of .30, and C
of .20). Nevertheless, there are various problems
encountered with consensually scored responses
(MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, & Zeidner, 2004): distri-
butions cannot be normal since the majority must score
the highest mark by definition. If tests are internally con-
sistent, the same majority of test takers will score cor-
rect answers for each question, and this will result in a
lack of discriminability of test takers of high and average
ability. If scores are distributed evenly, different people
will be scored with the correct answer for different
items. Consequently, inter-item correlations will be low
or negative. If group consensus scoring is applied to a
difficult dichotomous item (if an item is difficult, this
means that it is solved correctly by only a minority of
test takers), a test taker with high ability may receive
a low score (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2005;
Schulze, Wilhelm, & Kyllonen, 2007). Hence, a less able
person who gives the same answer as the majority of
test takers will receive a higher score. This means that
an analysis of item difficulties is not possible (Legree,
Psotka, Tremble, & Bourne, 2005; Schulze et al., 2007)
and that scoring will depend on the mean level of ability
in the sample. Considering these issues, consensus scor-
ing is not suitable for scoring a performance-based test.
1.2. Expert scoring
In expert scoring, a specified group of experts deter-
mines the correct response to an item. Legree (1995)
considers expert scoring to be a special case of consen-
sus scoring. Experts are expected to have a richer
knowledge base and to provide more reliable and accur-
ate judgments, particularly in areas such as clinical psy-
chology and physics (see Mayer & Geher, 1996; Mayer,
Salovey, Caruso, & Sitenarios, 2001).
A challenge to expert scoring is the need to deter-
mine the criteria for expertise and the context of ex-
pertise since there are no absolute criteria by which to
determine who is an expert. According to Weis (2008),
an expert in SI is a specialist who understands the inter-
nal states of an individual better than any outside ob-
server and better than the individual him or herself.
Expert scoring has been criticized for two main reasons.
First, experts’ answers tend to suffer from specific prob-
lems such as response bias, stereotypical thinking, sym-
pathy and similarity with the target, and implicit
personality theories (Cline, 1964). Second, the distinc-
tion between expert scoring and consensus scoring
seems to be a function of group size (Legree, 1995): Ex-
pert ratings may converge with the group consensus
when enough experts are consulted (e.g., Roberts et al.,
2001; see also Mayer et al., 2002). This emphasizes the
importance of selecting experts who all have excellent
knowledge of the relevant topic area.
Expert scoring seems to function better than consen-
sus scoring. The majority of people are probably not al-
ways right when answering a social understanding item if
we assume a normal distribution of the ability. An ex-
pert sample is a selected group of people who probably
deviate from the consensus of an unselected group of
2 Kristin Conzelmann and Panja Goerke
International Journal of Selection and Assessment
Volume 23 Number 1 March 2015
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
people. Items for which not all experts chose the same
category but their answers were varied can be taken
into account by calculating the Euclidean distance of the
test taker’s to the expert’s view.
1.3. Target scoring
Target scoring is based on the notion that the target
(i.e., creator of the item stimuli) has more information
about his or her mental state (i.e., emotions, motiva-
tions, cognitions, intentions) than any outside observer
(Mayer & Geher, 1996). The target determines the cor-
rect answers (i.e., the target him or herself decides
which emotion is expressed by his or her voice). In a
study by O’Sullivan (2007), targets were more accurate
at judging their own emotional experiences, whereas ac-
quaintances were more accurate at rating the target’s
behavior. However, targets may not be accurate report-
ers of their own emotions because of response biases
or poor self-understanding, or they may report only
pleasant emotions when they are actually feeling some-
thing else (Geher, Warner, & Brown, 2001). Thus, the
reliability of the target person’s answer is a very import-
ant precondition of the successful use of target scoring.
1.4. Relations between different scoring
procedures
Since all scoring methods have their problems and perils
of unreliability, Colvin and Bundick (2001) required the
application of multiple criteria for judging accuracy. Sev-
eral studies exist concerning the relation between ex-
pert and consensus-based scoring as well as between
target and consensus-based scores. In summary, there is
often a lack of correspondence between results ob-
tained with different scoring methods. For example,
Geher et al. (2001) found a correlation between target
and consensus scores on the Emotional Accuracy Re-
search Scale (EARS) of only .02. They explained the or-
thogonality of these measures by the observation that
humans are not adept at knowing the actual reasoning
that underlies their cognitive processes. Therefore, it
makes sense that consensus and target measures yield
different results. This is in line with Nisbett and Wilson
(1977), who argued that more often than we believe,
people are not privy to the actual reasoning underlying
their decisions. Knowing what an individual thinks he or
she is feeling may be quite different from knowing what
others think the same individual feels (Mayer & Geher,
1996).
Findings with respect to the Magdeburg Test of Social
Intelligence (MTSI, Süß, Seidel, & Weis, 2008) showed
some correspondence between target and consensus
scoring. In two studies with different groups totaling 317
test takers (students and a heterogeneous group of
adults), correlations of r = .61 to .82 between target and
consensus scoring were found for different modality-
specific social understanding scales, that is, pictorial,
auditory, and video-based (Seidel, 2008; Weis, 2008).
Possible reasons for the diverging findings may have
been the availability of objective social cues (e.g., tone of
voice, gesture, and posture) in the task material of the
MTSI social understanding tasks that were also used by
the test takers to judge the respective scenes. In addi-
tion, the targets were carefully selected according to
their openness and were well known by one of the test
developers, conditions that should have increased hon-
esty and reliability.
Weis (2008) observed that no investigations in the
literature had reported agreement between target and
expert scoring. This absence was addressed by the
current study as we applied a newly developed video-
based social understanding test (VSU), which, like the
MTSI, contains objective social cues in the task mater-
ial. These cues (e.g., voice, facial expression, body lan-
guage, and contextual features) were expected to be
available for both types of scoring. This was expected
to result in some overlap between expert and target
scoring. On the other hand, differences in scores were
expected since experts tend to take a more objective
observer perspective, whereas targets are subjectively
involved and thus may suffer from a lack of self-insight
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Reilly & Doherty, 1992). Fur-
thermore, different meta-analyses have shown that the
self-other agreement of performance is low to medium
(Conway & Huffcutt, 1997; Harris & Schaubroek, 1988;
Heidemeier & Moser, 2009). Consequently, we ex-
pected low to moderate correlations between expert
and target scores.
1.5. Different instructions for different scoring
procedures
In earlier studies comparing expert and consensus scor-
ing (e.g., Mayer et al., 2002; Roberts et al., 2001) or tar-
get and consensus scoring (e.g., Geher et al., 2001;
Mayer & Geher, 1996), different scoring keys were ap-
plied to the same data to investigate the effects of differ-
ent ways of scoring on the scores that were awarded.
However, different perspectives and instructions are
also involved when different scoring approaches are ap-
plied. If the test is evaluated by consensus scoring, the
test taker should adopt a group perspective (answer ac-
cording to the majority of the group). A test taker
evaluated by expert scoring should give ratings from the
perspective of an observer. An applicant evaluated by a
target-scored test should give ratings from an internal
perspective (answer according to the target’s point of
view). The scoring-specific instructions also affect the
item difficulty. There can be different item difficulty val-
ues for the same item depending on the instructions if
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an easy item means that most of the subjects chose the
correct response and a difficult item means that only a
few test takers answered correctly. But the interpreta-
tion of ‘correct’ depends on whether subjects are in-
structed to identify the answer that the majority of the
tested group would give, to select the answer that ex-
perts would choose, or to answer like the target person
would.
So far, research has not yet been conducted to invest-
igate how these different perspectives, which are the re-
sults of these different instructions, influence the rela-
tions among different methods of scoring and the effects
of the scores on convergent and discriminant validity
criteria. However, Freudenthaler, Neubauer, and Haller
(2008) examined the effects of maximum versus typical
performance instructions on the convergent and dis-
criminant validity of an EI performance test. They found
that test takers scored higher on the EI performance
test under maximum performance instructions. There
were different relations of the emotional performance
test to personality and cognitive ability measures de-
pending on the instructions for completing it: using typ-
ical performance instructions, they found substantial
relations between personality, depression, and life satis-
faction scales, whereas when using maximum perform-
ance instructions, relations to cognitive ability were
significant and also higher. Studies from other streams
of research have also yielded evidence concerning how
different perspectives result in different reactions.
Bateson, Early, and Salvarani (1997) distinguished be-
tween an ‘image other’ perspective (imagining how an-
other person feels) and an ‘image self’ perspective
(imagining how you would feel in the other person’s
shoes). In an experiment, the ‘image other’ perspective
produced empathy and eventually resulted in altruistic
motivation, whereas the ‘image self’ perspective created
empathy and eventually turned into personal distress
and egoistic motivation. Thus, projecting oneself into
different perspectives resulted in different motives and
reactions. Epley and Caruso (2009) also observed
interindividual differences in this ability.
Results such as these indicate that not considering the
nature of the instructions may lead to inaccurate or mis-
leading results. It follows that the different perspectives
operationalized by the instructions may represent differ-
ent tasks, which could even address different underlying
abilities. Therefore, we expected that scores that took
the instructions into account would differ more than
scores that excluded the effects of the instructions.
1.6. Hypotheses and questions
The aim of this paper was, first, to investigate the over-
lap and distinctiveness of target and expert scoring of
the VSU while taking into account the effects of instruc-
tions. A second aim was to examine how the different
scoring procedures and instructions would affect the
convergent (measured as the relation to assessment
center performance) and discriminant construct validity
of the test (measured as relations to basic cognitive abil-
ity, knowledge, and personality).
H1: Expert and target scoring of an identical item pool
will be correlated to a moderate degree.
H2: Expert and target scores that take into consider-
ation the respective instructions will be correlated
to a lesser degree than scores that disregard the
instructions.
The investigation of the effects of the instructions and
scoring method on the construct validity of the VSU is
rather exploratory. Convergent measures (AC perform-
ance) and divergent measures (basic cognitive ability and
personality) were applied. Since both types of VSU
scores are assumed to represent aspects of social un-
derstanding (either different or the same) and both rely
on a performance test, we did not expect large differ-
ences between expert and target scores. However, we
did not know of any other comparable study that has
taken into account the effects of both scoring and in-
structions on validity.
2. The VSU and its scoring keys
The VSU items were developed according to the prin-
ciples of SJTs (e.g., Kyllonen & Lee, 2005; McDaniel &
Nguyen, 2001) and integrated the postdiction paradigm
(O’Sullivan, 1983) into the scenario approach. Like typ-
ical SJTs, the VSU involves the (social) context and
works with realistic scenarios. However, the VSU has to
be distinguished from the standard SJT in the following
ways: First, the situations and items are unscripted and
entirely natural, real-life video scenes. Second, items are
constructed differently and thus require different an-
swer patterns. On an SJT, test takers are asked to as-
sess the best behavior in a hypothetical situation and to
either choose the most appropriate response from sev-
eral alternatives or rank the responses. For the VSU,
test takers have to interpret or infer a target person’s
thoughts, feelings, and relationships and judge answer al-
ternatives according to their degree of appropriateness.
The test taker’s answer is compared with either an ex-
pert view (expert scoring) or the view of the target who
was in the situation (target scoring). The test principle
was rooted in the social understanding tasks of the
MTSI (Süß et al., 2008). The MTSI is a SI test that, in-
cluding social understanding, assesses social memory
and social perception with veridical video-based, aud-
itory, pictorial, and written material and, unlike other SI
tests, involves the social context. It is described in detail
in Conzelmann et al. (2013). Unlike the MTSI, the VSU
(1) uses complete video scenes (audio and video) in-
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stead of separating the auditory from the visual channel,
(2) exclusively focuses on occupational scenes (in an
aviation context), and (3) integrates findings from peer
ratings into test development.
The VSU contains two scenarios dealing with two
male pilot trainees (targets) from a well-respected
German airline. Targets were volunteers who were cho-
sen according to their scores on a personality scale
measuring openness (Freiburger Persönlichkeitsinventar
[Freiburg Personality Inventory]; Fahrenberg, Hampel, &
Selg, 2010). Since the reliability of target scoring de-
pends on the reliability of the targets’ answers, the pre-
ferred targets were high on openness and low on social
desirability so that they would be likely to provide in-
formation honestly. The potential targets were deliber-
ately selected to differ in their personality profiles
(NEO- five factor inventory [NEO-FFI], Borkenau &
Ostendorf, 1993; Interpersonal Circumplex, Horowitz,
Strauß, & Kordy, 2000) to ensure that the VSU would
assess a more general ability that would not depend on
a certain personality type (except for openness). How-
ever, it is unclear how both the similarity and sympathy
of the test taker with respect to the target can influence
the test result, but this was yet another reason for
choosing targets with different personality profiles. The
video recordings took place during the targets’ typical
everyday lives in the flight training school. All partici-
pants in a social situation (i.e., target persons, flight
trainers, peers, and friends) gave their written consent
to use the collected material and data for test develop-
ment and research.
2.1. Development of target scoring
The targets answered questions about their mental state
(i.e., emotions, cognitions, and relationships to people
interacting in the corresponding situation) on a visual
analog rating scale. For example, in one VSU scenario,
two flight trainees provide feedback to one another. An
emotion item example is ‘How difficult is it for the tar-
get person to provide feedback to his peer?’ with a rat-
ing scale ranging from ‘not at all difficult’ to ‘extremely
difficult.’ A cognition item example is ‘Why does the
target laugh as he provides feedback to his peer?’ (Item
1), ‘He feels insecure.’ (Item 2), ‘He wants to soften his
criticism.’ Both items have to be rated on a scale ranging
from ‘does not apply at all’ to ‘totally applies.’
A peer who was well known by the target person and
present in most of the recorded situations completed
the same questions as the target from the target’s per-
spective. The target person’s answer was considered
the ‘correct’ answer to the question (i.e., test item) as
long as the peer agreed. In addition, the reliability of the
target’s rating was examined using objective social cues
that were present in the item material and that provided
hints about the answer. A lack of correspondence be-
tween the target’s answer and the available cues in the
material resulted in the exclusion of that item from the
test. The target’s answer was then transformed from
the visual analogue rating scale by assigning a rating cat-
egory to a target’s score according to seven equally dis-
tributed steps on the analogue scale (7-point rating
scale). For example, for the emotion item mentioned
above, the target’s answer fell in category ‘2,’ meaning
that it was rather easy to provide feedback to the peer
(ranging from 1 = extremely easy to 7 = extremely difficult).
Finally, the two targets had to individually complete
the test to ensure that the selection of material and
questions corresponded to their real answers. When
there was any lack of correspondence, the item was ex-
cluded. To compute the test taker’s score on an item,
first, the absolute difference (in either direction) be-
tween the target’s answer and the test taker’s answer
was computed. Then, the test taker’s score was always
given a negative sign when it did not match the target’s
answer perfectly. In addition, the score was weighted by
the greatest possible deviation in order to give each
item the same weight.
2.2. Development of expert scoring
Experts were 18 experienced psychologists in the field
of personnel selection; 15 were aviation psychologists,
and three were consultants from other branches. All ex-
perts were nominated by the test developers because of
their experience in interpreting human behavior. The
experts were between the ages of 29 and 62 with a
mean age of 38 (SD = 9.5); 72% of the experts were fe-
male. The experts were asked to provide their personal
answers to the questions after watching realistic video
scenes. The test taker’s score on an item was deter-
mined by computing Euclidean distances, resulting in
small positive scores when differences from the mean
expert score were small, and in large positive scores
when differences from the mean expert score were
large. Using the standard deviation of the group ensured
that a larger amount of variability in the experts’ an-
swers was included in the evaluation of a test taker’s an-
swer. The final score was formed by taking the square
root of the term, such that better performances were
indicated for test takers with smaller deviations from
the experts’ mean value (i.e., smaller scores).
2.3. Scenarios and instructions
Each scenario in the VSU involved six scenes encom-
passing between 2 and 10 items. The scenario was in-
troduced with a short self-presentation by the target to
allow test takers to become familiar with the target’s
voice and physical appearance. Each scene began with a
short text that presented basic background information,
which contained situational cues that were necessary for
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understanding the scene. Test takers were required to
judge the mental states of the target (i.e., the target’s
emotions, cognitions, and relationships to others) on
the basis of the information provided (Costanzo &
Archer, 1993; Moss et al., 1955; Rosenthal, Hall,
DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979).
Depending on the scoring procedure to be used, test
takers were asked to take different perspectives. The in-
structions to answer the questions from the target’s
perspective (internal perspective) accompanied the tar-
get scoring. For the expert scoring condition, the test
takers were instructed to interpret the target’s behavior
from their own point of view (observer perspective).
3. Method
3.1. Procedure
The study took place during the ab initio pilot selection
procedure at the DLR. Applicants completed a multi-
stage selection procedure with four stages in total: (1)
basic cognitive ability and knowledge tests, and an
aviation-specific personality questionnaire, (2) an assess-
ment center, (3) a fixed-base simulator test, (4) and an
interview. The VSU was administered during the first
(Sample 1) and the second (Sample 2) selection stages.
Thus, only applicants who were successful in the first
selection stage were tested again (the selection rate
from the first to second stage of testing was 35.7%).
Therefore, the variance in Sample 2 was more restricted
than in Sample 1, which had already involved a very
homogeneous group of people.
3.2. Study design and participants
To investigate the relation between the scoring meth-
ods and the effect of the instructions, we utilized a
crossed design. Sample 1 consisted of 529 applicants for
a pilot training program between the ages of 17 and 29
(M = 20.46, SD = 2.58); 86% were male. Subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the two test conditions (in-
ternal perspective with target scoring n = 247 or ob-
server perspective with expert scoring n = 282).
A subsample of n = 132 participants (Sample 2) com-
pleted the VSU again using the other perspective
(internal n = 76; observer n = 56) if they had been suc-
cessful in the previous selection stage. The time interval
between the two administrations was 21.57 weeks
on average (SD = 9.88 weeks) with a minimum of
6.71 weeks and a maximum of 59.71 weeks. The time in-
terval varied considerably since (1) there was variability
in the Stage 1 test dates; (2) there was variability in the
Stage 2 test dates; (3) there were sometimes personal
restrictions (i.e., since the selection procedure takes a
long time in total, some applicants had decided to attend
a university or go abroad in the meantime). The differ-
ent sample sizes for the internal and observer instruc-
tions occurred by chance and can be ascribed to
applicants dropping out in selection Stage 1 (for basic
cognitive ability and knowledge tests, see 3.1). The mean
age of the subsample was 20.61 years (SD = 2.46 years),
and 90.9% were male.
3.3. Measures
3.3.1. Social understanding
The VSU (see Section 2) was used as a measure of social
understanding in Samples 1 and 2.
3.3.2. Basic cognitive ability tests, knowledge tests, and
grade point average (GPA)
Basic cognitive ability tests were administered in Sample
1 for the domains of numerical operations, memory,
speed of information processing, and spatial orientation.
Knowledge tests consisted of knowledge of technical in-
formation and English. These tests are well established
in the selection system and are continually validated.
Cronbach’s α ranged from α = .76 (numerical opera-
tions) to α = .97 (speed of information processing). Per-
formance on the VSU was also related to GPA.
3.3.3. Personality
The Temperament Structure Scales (TSS, Maschke,
1986) were used as an aviation-specific personality ques-
tionnaire in Sample 1. The scales measure personal
styles/tendencies such as achievement motivation, extra-
version, compromise, assertion, and empathy. The TSS
uses a forced-choice item format. The internal consist-
ency of the scales ranged from α = .61 (achievement
motivation, compromise) to α = .82 (assertion)
(Goeters, Timmermann, & Maschke, 1993).
3.3.4. Assessment Center (AC) performance
The AC was comprised of three exercises: role-play, a
problem-solving group exercise, and a conflict-oriented
group exercise. Each candidate was independently as-
sessed on the behavioral dimensions leadership, coop-
eration, and commitment by two trained observers
(an aviation psychologist and an airline pilot) using an
observer rotation plan. No major differences were
found between the ratings given by airline pilots and
aviation psychologists. In the current sample, inter-rater
agreement (ICC 1,2) was .70 (leadership), .62 (coopera-
tion), and .72 (commitment) regardless of the raters’
professions.
3.4. VSU scale building and calculation of internal
consistency
The total scales were built for both Samples 1 and 2.
Given that the appropriate procedure for evaluating the
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score is to examine participants’ answers in an
instruction-specific manner (i.e., participants who were
administered the observer instructions were evaluated
by expert scoring), we built two scales that took the in-
structions into consideration (expert scoring with ob-
server instructions and target scoring with internal
instructions). In addition, to examine the differences be-
tween the types of scoring independent of the type of
instructions as was done in past studies, an instruction-
unspecific scale was built for each type of scoring (=
‘both’; i.e., data were target or expert scored, excluding
the effect of the instructions). Some of the items yielded
negative item-total correlations. These items were
eliminated from the scale. Next, items scored by target
and expert scoring were synchronized in order to com-
pare the scores that were computed on the same items
with one another. In order to estimate the reduction in
reliability because of the synchronization, item selection
was also computed separately for each scale, target, and
expert, resulting in optimized scores (if only target or
expert scoring had been applied). We refrained from
building separate scales for the different types of VSU
items (cognition, emotion, relationship) because of their
limited and varying numbers (e.g., six relationship items,
13 emotion items, 20 cognition items, one about the
typicality) and insufficient Cronbach’s α values (.30 to
.45 in Sample 1; .31 to .59 Sample 2) for the final syn-
chronized scale. Instead, we decided to aggregate these
items into one total score.
4. Results
4.1. Psychometric properties
Table 1 presents the psychometric properties of the
total synchronized scales for both samples. Compared
with the optimum item pools, Cronbach’s α as well as
the number of selected items decreased. The optimized
scores were different for target (k = 51; α = .71 when
the internal instructions were considered, α = .73
when they were not) and expert scoring (k = 58, α = .70
when the observer instructions were considered,
α = .68 when they were not). Cronbach’s α values re-
mained consistent for the target and expert scoring in
Sample 2; however, the item-total correlation showed
more variation. For the expert-scored VSU scale, there
was only one item with a negative item-total correlation
(both types of instructions and observer instructions);
and for the target-scored VSU scale, there were three
items with negative item-total correlations. Three of the
four critical items were part of scenario A, and the ma-
jority of the items dealt with emotions.
Descriptive statistics from the basic ability and know-
ledge tests, personality scales, and AC performance can
be found in Table 2. Correlations between all study vari-
ables can be found in the Table A1 (see Appendix A).
4.2. Relation between target and expert scoring
The examination of the relation between target and
expert scores was conducted in two stages. First, the
expert and target scores were correlated, excluding
the influence of the specific instructions (as was done
in previous studies on scoring issues). Second, the
subsample who took the test twice (Stages 1 and 2)
was further investigated with regard to how the scores
from the first testing stage (which were either target
or expert scores) were related to the scores from the
second testing stage (which were expert scores for the
group that had target scores in the first stage and tar-
get scores for the group that had expert scores in the
first stage). The synchronized scale was used in both
analyses.
The correlation1 between target and expert scores
was moderate in both Samples 1 (r = −.47, p < .01,
n = 529) and 2 (r = −.34, p < .01, n = 132) and higher in
Sample 1 when the type of instructions (observer vs.
internal) was not considered. However, correlation
coefficients decreased drastically when the type of in-
structions was considered. If both the target version of
the VSU was applied with internal instructions in Stage 1
and test takers completed the VSU with expert scoring
Table 1. Psychometric properties of the total VSU synchronized scales (Samples 1 and 2)
Synchronized
scale Scoring Instructions
Item
count Ma SDa rit-Range α
Sample 1 Target Both 40 −2.09 .41 .05 to .38 .69
Internal 40 −2.08 .38 .05 to .38 .65
Expert Both 40 2.08 .77 .07 to .27 .62
Observer 40 2.12 .78 .06 to .28 .64
Sample 2 Target Both 40 −1.87 .38 −.13 to .48 .70
Internal 40 −1.87 .39 −.15 to .50 .72
Expert Both 40 1.74 .67 −.07 to .37 .68
Observer 40 1.70 .65 −.17 to .47 .68
aMeans of target and expert scores cannot be compared directly since target scores are means of weighted differences from the targets’ answer and
expert scores are means of Euclidean distances from the experts’ opinion.
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with observer instructions in Stage 2, the correlation
dropped to a nonsignificant level (r = −.18, p > .05,
n = 56). The same occurred when the roles were re-
versed (r = −.21, p > .05, n = 76). This decrease was sig-
nificant for the difference between the correlation
coefficient in Sample 1 (both instructions) compared
with the instruction-specific correlations (Z = 2.38,
n = 76 and Z = 2.28, n = 56, both ps < .05, two-tailed
testing).
No applicant worked on the same version of the test
twice. The instructions always differed from the first to
the second administration. Test takers completed the
VSU either with the internal instructions first and the
observer instructions second or vice versa. Typical re-
test reliability could not be assessed. Also, the target
and expert scores could not be compared directly be-
cause target scores are difference values, whereas ex-
pert scores are Euclidean distance scores. However,
when the specific instructions were not considered, test
takers improved from the first to the second adminis-
tration. Applying expert scoring to all applicants at Stage
1 and Stage 2 resulted in improved VSU scores at Stage
2 (Mstage1 = 2.04, SD = .70; Mstage2 = 1.74, SD = .67). The
findings for the application of target scoring to all applic-
ants at Stage 1 and Stage 2 were comparable
(Mstage1 = −2.05, SD = .42; Mstage2 = −1.87, SD = .38). Be-
cause all applicants improved, this did not affect the
correlation.
4.3. Relation between VSU performance and AC
performance
There were no significant correlations between VSU
target scores and AC performance in the assessed di-
mensions (see Table 3). The correlations with the VSU
expert scores were also low. There was only one
significant positive relation observed with the commit-
ment shown in the AC. The more committed the applic-
ants were, as evaluated with the AC tasks (see Section
3.3.4), the worse they performed on the expert-scored
version of the VSU with observer instructions. Out of
the AC dimensions, commitment is surely the least so-
cial and the least similar to social understanding. Never-
theless, we do not have an interpretation for this finding
and prefer to first investigate whether this result can be
confirmed in a similar study.
4.4. Relation of VSU performance to basic
cognitive abilities, knowledge, and personality
In both samples, the VSU scores were correlated with
knowledge (technical and English), basic cognitive ability
tests (i.e., spatial orientation, numerical operations,
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used to assess convergent and discriminant validity
Variable Mean SD Min Max Scale
AC performanceb
(Stage 2 sample)
Leadership 2.93 6.70 1.50 4.67 1 to 6
Cooperation 3.13 5.90 1.67 4.33 1 to 6
Commitment 2.81 6.49 1.50 4.33 1 to 6
Basic cognitive abilities and knowledgea (Stage 1 sample)
English knowledge 0 .99 −2.94 2.41 −3 to +3
Technical knowledge 0 .92 −2.05 2.63 −3 to +3
Numerical operations 0 .86 −2.54 1.86 −3 to +3
Memory 0 .88 −2.47 2.16 −3 to +3
Speed of information processing 0 .91 −2.91 1.74 −3 to +3
Spatial orientation 0 .91 −2.22 1.24 −3 to +3
GPA 2.5 .63 1.0 3.8 1 to 4
Personalityb (Stage 1 sample)
Achievement motivation 8.15 3.10 .00 15.00 0 to 15
Extraversion 11.37 3.02 .00 15.00 0 to 15
Compromise 5.71 3.03 .00 15.00 0 to 15
Assertion 9.33 3.84 .00 15.00 0 to 15
Empathy 10.49 3.45 .00 15.00 0 to 15
Note: GPA = grade point average (corresponding to the final grade of the university entrance diploma); AC = assessment center. aRegression factor
scores: mean = 0. bRaw scores.
Table 3. Correlations between VSU scores and performance
in the assessment center (Stage 2 sample)
AC performance
Target scoring Expert scoring
Both
instr
(n = 132)
Internal
instr
(n = 76)
Both
instr
(n = 132)
Observer
instr
(n = 56)
Leadership −.05 −.11 .02 .21
Cooperation −.01 −.09 .04 .14
Commitment .05 .07 .06 .28*
Note: *p < .05. instr = instructions; AC = assessment center.
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memory, and information processing speed), and the
personality scales (see Table 4).
With the exception of a significant correlation in the
Stage 1 sample between the target score and numerical
operations (internal instructions), there were no mean-
ingful positive relations with basic cognitive ability tests.
The nonsignificant relation between VSU performance
and the final grade on the university entry diploma
complemented this finding (see Table 4).
Similarly, there were only a few significant relations
with personality variables. In Sample 1, ‘compromise’
was correlated with the target-scored VSU performance
(internal instructions) and ‘assertion’ with the expert-
scored VSU performance (observer instructions). In
Sample 2, ‘achievement motivation’ was correlated with
the expert-scored VSU performance (both instructions).
5. Discussion
In this study, we investigated the relation between tar-
get and expert scoring with respect to the influence of
the scoring-specific instructions. Furthermore, we ana-
lyzed the differential effects of the scoring procedures
and instructions of the VSU on convergent and discrim-
inant validity.
5.1. Relation between expert and target scoring
of the VSU depending on the instructions
As hypothesized, target and expert scores were moder-
ately correlated (thus confirming H1). A possible reason
for the difference between the scores may be the lack
of the target’s self-insight (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977;
Reilly & Doherty, 1992) compared with the more ob-
jective expert ratings. Different instructions consider-
ably influenced the relation between the two scoring
methods. The correlation between target- and expert-
scored VSU performances showed an obvious decrease
when the type of instructions was also considered (thus
confirming H2). This may occur because the test taker
who completes the VSU from an observer perspective is
actually performing a different task than the test taker
who completes the VSU from an internal perspective,
and these different tasks may measure different underly-
ing constructs. There is some confirmation of the influ-
ence of different perspectives in other areas of research;
for example, different perspectives resulting in different
underlying motives and reactions (Bateson et al., 1997).
Also, neuropsychological findings indicate that different
areas of the brain become involved according to
whether a person’s own perspective or another per-
son’s perspective is taken (Ruby & Decety, 2004).
5.2. Convergent validity depending on scoring and
instructions
Independent of the instructions and the type of scoring,
there were no meaningful relations of the VSU with AC
performance. First, not many studies have investigated
the relations between social understanding measured
with a performance test and AC performance. Runde
and Etzel (2004) found a correlation of r = .35 between
AC performance and performance on their video-based
Table 4. Relations of VSU scores with basic cognitive ability and knowledge tests, GPA, and personality scales
Stage 1 sample Stage 2 sample
Target scoring Expert scoring Target scoring Expert scoring
Both
instr
(n = 529)
Internal
instr
(n = 247)
Both
instr
(n = 529)
Observ
instr
(n = 282)
Both
instr
(n = 132)
Internal
instr
(n = 76)
Both
instr
(n = 132)
Observ
instr
(n = 56)
Basic cognitive abilities and knowledge
English knowledge .02 .06 −.06 −.08 .00 −.02 .01 −.09
Technical knowledge .00 −.07 .03 .04 .04 .04 −.03 −.07
Numerical operations −.04 −.14* .04 .00 .04 .14 .09 .21
Memory .09* .02 −.01 −.05 −.05 −.04 .16 .02
Inf. processing speed .02 −.03 .03 .01 −.08 −.06 .16 .21
Spatial orientation .05 −.03 −.01 −.02 −.04 −.02 .12 .07
GPAa .01 .12 −.03 .02 .11 .21 −.18 −.17
Personality
Achievement motivation −.02 −.08 .01 −.11 −.05 −.14 .19* .24
Extraversion .04 .09 −.04 −.01 .00 −.16 .09 .07
Compromise −.04 −.13* .05 .03 −.06 −.06 .14 .23
Assertion −.02 −.01 −.05 −.13* −.09 −.18 −.04 .04
Empathy −.01 −.04 −.08 −.05 .06 −.06 −.01 .00
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. GPA = grade point average (corresponding to the final grade of the university entrance diploma); inf = information;
observ = observer; instr = instructions. aThe sample size deviates from the maximum possible sample size since some of the applicants did not have
the university entrance diploma when they applied.
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expert-scored social understanding test called VISION.
However, this measure differs from the VSU in import-
ant aspects. VISION involves video scenes that are acted
out, and therefore, the process of item generation was
completely different from the VSU. There are several
possibilities that may account for why the VSU did not
show a meaningful relation with AC performance in this
study. First, differences in measures may account for the
lack of correlation. Whereas the VSU is a psychometric
test, AC measures involve behavioral observation. Sec-
ond, there are differences in the underlying construct
as the VSU is intended to evaluate the cognit-
ive precondition for socially competent behavior,
whereas the AC assesses the behavior itself. Third, the
VSU was developed on the basis of real-life situations,
whereas the AC makes use of constructed situations.
AC exercises make use of obvious social scenarios, such
as extreme conflicts. By contrast, the VSU presents
subtle social situations such as cooperative social
everyday-life situations. Fourth, the findings may also
be due to the specific preselected sample of pilot
applicants. They all held a university entrance diploma
and showed high technical interests. The selection effect
was even greater in the AC subsample since the parti-
cipants were among the 35.7% of applicants who passed
the academic intelligence and knowledge test in selec-
tion Stage 1. Thus, the variance was restricted and
may have played a role in reducing the strength of the
correlations.
5.3. Discriminant validity depending on scoring
and instructions
Significant relations of the VSU with cognitive ability,
GPA, and personality were scarce, independent of the
type of scoring method and instructions.
The lack of meaningful relations between the VSU
scores and both basic cognitive ability and knowledge
tests are somewhat similar to findings obtained with the
MTSI (see Conzelmann et al., 2013). In a confirmatory
factor analysis, social understanding measured with the
MTSI was separate from academic intelligence measured
with the Berlin Intelligence Structure Test (Jäger, Süß, &
Beauducel, 1997). Mayer and Geher (1996) also did not
report significant relations between EARS target scores
and self-reported Scholastic Aptitude Test scores. The
lack of significant correlations between the VSU scores
and GPA, which is usually associated with performance
in basic cognitive ability measures, supports this hypo-
thesis. However, whether the VSU is indeed separate
from academic intelligence tests, has to be investigated
with factor analytic techniques and other measures of
academic intelligence.
A lack of correlations between social understanding
and personality is a common finding in the field of
SI (see Brown & Anthony, 1990; Riggio, Messamer, &
Throckmorton, 1991). It remains an open question
whether social understanding and personality constructs
are independent or whether this result has to be attrib-
uted to the application of different methods (perform-
ance test vs. self-report measure).
5.4. Conclusions and future research needs
Concerning general research on scoring issues in the
field of social understanding, this study made clear that
the type of instructions must be considered when con-
ducting studies and interpreting their results. Taking the
effects of scoring and instructions into account may help
to explain the divergent findings reported across re-
search studies. The criterion should be considered be-
fore making a final decision about which scoring method
to use. Putting oneself in the position of a target and
thinking, feeling, and behaving from the target’s point of
view may be required for assessing the performance of
actors. Yet, a general ability to interpret other people’s
relationships, cognitions, and feelings may be useful for
assessing the suitability of someone applying for a social
profession such as a teacher, salesperson, lawyer, or
social worker.
Concerning the application of the VSU in the practice
of pilot selection, the use of expert scoring with ob-
server instructions is recommended. Working success-
fully as a pilot requires that one is able to interpret the
other pilot’s and crew members’ intentions, feelings, and
behavior from an observer perspective instead of put-
ting oneself in their shoes. Being able to interpret be-
havior the way the VSU requires should not only result
in fewer human errors in aviation but also in positive so-
cial and emotional effects (Arriaga & Rusbult, 1998;
Epley & Caruso, 2009) such as better and more satisfac-
tory relationships among crew members.
The expert scoring procedure that was applied in this
study is restricted since experts were not involved in
the item development, but the items were developed on
the basis of the targets’ answers, and distractors were
generated by the test developers. Thus, the appropriate
answer from the experts’ perspective might be missing.
However, this does not affect the task of the VSU,
which is to judge the target person’s cognitions, emo-
tions, and behavior according to specified aspects that
are prevalent in the item alternatives. It is not necessar-
ily important that the ‘correct’ answer is included.
The expert scoring method reported in this study
should be validated by another preferentially gender-
balanced expert sample including experts from different
professions that deal with the interpretation of others’
behavior. In future studies, similarity to and sympathy
with the target should be controlled because Davis,
Conklin, Smith, and Luce (1996) found indications that a
person’s self-representation, particularly with regard to
positive traits, influences the evaluation of the target.
10 Kristin Conzelmann and Panja Goerke
International Journal of Selection and Assessment
Volume 23 Number 1 March 2015
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
In the future, it would be worthwhile to collect in-
formation on convergent validity with appropriate
measures. Therefore, the VSU should be related to the
MTSI and other tests that measure the same or related
constructs such as the Situational Test of Emotion Man-
agement and Emotion Understanding (MacCann, 2006)
and the Face Recognition Test (Wilhelm et al., 2010).
To demonstrate the usefulness of the VSU for per-
sonnel selection, there is a need to relate it to appropri-
ate criteria collected in job-relevant social situations.
The VSU itself needs to undergo further develop-
ment. In Sample 2, very few item-total correlations were
still negative. Why these items worked well only in
Sample 1 has to be examined further. Target-scored
items were more susceptible to negative item-total cor-
relations (see also Conzelmann et al., 2013). Despite the
advantages of target scoring, the quality of the target’s
answer might be impaired by two aspects: First, targets
need a high level of self-reflection to identify their real
mental states and then to adequately communicate
these states. Second, a target might have unintentionally
or intentionally been drawn to the tendency to respond
in a socially acceptable manner (MacCann et al., 2004;
Mayer & Geher, 1996).
This study yielded the first findings about the relation
between expert and target scores. Moreover, it clarified
the idea that scoring issues need to be examined com-
prehensively, taking into account the test instructions.
Note
1. The negative weighting of correlation coefficients was ac-
cording to our expectations.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Correlations between all study variables
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1. S1_T_B 1 (529)
2. S1_T_I 1 (247) 1 (247)
3. S1_E_B −.47** (529) −.50** (247) 1 (529)
4. S1_E_O −.45** (282) – 1 (282) 1 (282)
5. S2_T_B .74** (132) .71** (56) −.32** (132) −.21 (76) 1 (132)
6. S2_T_I – – −.21 (76) −.21 (76) 1 (76) 1 (76)
7. S2_E_B −.18* (132) −.18* (56) .42** (132) .30** (76) −.34** (132) −.34** (76) 1 (132)
8. S2_E_O −.18 (56) −.18 (56) .58** (56) – −.35** (56) – 1 (56) 1 (56)
9. English knowledge .02 (529) .02 (247) −.06 (529) −.08 (282) .00 (132) −.02 (76) .01 (132) −.09 (56) 1 (529)
10. Technical knowledge .00 (529) −.07 (247) .03 (529) .04 (282) .04 (132) .04 (76) −.03 (132) −.07 (56) −.34** (529) 1 (529)
11. Numerical operations −.04 (529) −.14* (247) .04* (529) .00 (282) .04 (132) .14 (76) .04 (132) .04 (56) .33** (529) .53** (529) 1 (529)
12. Memory .09* (529) .02 (247) −.01 (529) −.05 (282) −.05 (132) −.04 (76) .16 (132) .02 (56) .35** (529) .47** (529) .54** (529)
13. Inf. processing speed .02 (529) −.03 (247) .03 (529) .01 (282) −.08 (132) −.06 (76) .16 (132) .21 (56) .29** (529) .39** (529) .50** (529)
14. Spatial orientation .05 (529) −.03 (247) −.01 (529) −.02 (282) −.04 (132) −.02 (76) .12 (132) .07 (56) .32** (529) .49** (529) .55** (529)
15. GPAa .01 (421) .12 (209) −.03 (412) .02 (212) .11 (111) .21 (61) −.18 (111) −.17 (50) −.33** (421) −.32** (421) −.40** (421)
16. Achievement motivation −.02 (529) −.08 (247) .01 (529) −.11 (282) −.05 (132) −.14 (76) .19* (132) .24 (56) −.06 (529) −.05 (529) .06 (529)
17. Extraversion .04 (529) .09 (247) −.04 (529) −.01 (282) .00 (132) −.16 (76) .09 (132) .07 (56) −.10* (529) −.13** (529) −.02 (529)
18. Compromise .04 (529) −.13* (247) .05 (529) .03 (282) −.06 (132) −.06 (76) .14 (132) .23 (56) −.01 (529) −.13** (529) −.09* (529)
19. Assertion −.02 (529) −.01 (247) −.05 (529) −.13* (282) −.09 (132) −.18 (76) −.04 (132) .04 (56) −.03 (529) −.01 (529) −.01 (529)
20. Empathy −.01 (529) −.04 (247) −.08 (529) −.05 (282) .06 (132) −.06 (76) −.01 (132) −.00 (56) −.02 (529) −.09* (529) −.02 (529)
21. Leadership −.02 (132) .15 (56) −.01 (132) −.06 (76) −.05 (132) −.11 (76) .02 (132) .21 (56) −.08 (132) .04 (132) .21* (132)
22. Cooperation .01 (132) .21 (56) .01 (132) .07 (76) −.01 (132) −.09 (76) .04 (132) .14 (56) −.12 (132) .04 (132) −.11 (132)
23. Commitment .05 (132) .08 (56) −.02 (132) −.09 (76) .05 (132) .07 (76) .06 (132) .28 (56) −.09 (132) −.01 (132) .19* (132)
12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
1. S1_T_B
2. S1_T_I
3. S1_E_B
4. S1_E_O
5. S2_T_B
6. S2_T_I
7. S2_E_B
8. S2_E_O
9. English knowledge
10. Technical knowledge
11. Numerical operations
12. Memory 1 (529)
13. Inf. processing speed .82** (529) 1 (529)
14. Spatial orientation .80** (529) .80** (529) 1 (529)
15. GPAa −.36** (421) −.31** (421) −.32** (421) 1 (421)
16. Achievement motivation .08 (529) .10* (529) .03 (529) −.29** (421) 1 (529)
17. Extraversion −.08 (529) −.05 (529) −.12** (529) −.03 (421) .19** (529) 1 (529)
18. Compromise −.09* (529) −.12 (529) −.12** (529) .14** (421) −.05 (529) .05 (529) 1 (529)
19. Assertion .05 (529) .08 (529) .04 (529) −.02 (421) .20** (529) .28** (529) .21** (529) 1 (529)
20. Empathy −.06 (529) −.03 (529) −.08 (529) .00 (421) .28** (529) .35** (529) .06 (529) .12* (529) 1 (529)
21. Leadership .13 (132) .16 (132) .11 (132) −.32** (132) .10 (132) .18* (132) −.12 (132) .05 (132) .16* (132) 1 (132)
22. Cooperation .05 (132) .12 (132) .00 (132) −.13 (132) .16* (132) .15 (132) −.15 (132) −.20* (132) .26** (132) .47** (132) 1 (132)
23. Commitment .18 (132) .12 (132) .05 (132) −.33** (111) .08 (132) .17* (132) −.14 (132) .00 (132) .21** (132) .84** (132) .49** (132)
Note: *p < .05. **p < .01. S1 = Study 1; S2 = Study 2; T = target scoring; E = expert scoring; I = internal instructions; O = observer instructions; Inf. = information; GPA = grade point average (corre-
sponding to the final grade on the university entrance diploma). aThe sample size deviates from the maximum possible sample size because some of the applicants did not have the university entrance
diploma when they applied.
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